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Eds. Vern Neufeld Redekop and Thomas Ryba. Notre Dame IN: Lexington Books, 2013: 119-219.
Publisher link. © 2013 Lexington Books. All rights reserved. Please contact the publisher for
permission to copy, distribute or reprint.

Chapter Ten

Lonergan on Imitating the Divine
Relations)
Robert M. Doran

A PREFARATORY NOTE ON LONERGAN AND GIRARD
Bernard Lonergan and Rene Girard are both students of human desire. It may
be claimed, I believe, that a synthesis of their respective positions would
provide the broad outlines of something approximating a heuristic structure
for the study of desire. The basic categories of such a heuristic structure
would be "natural desires," "elicited desires," "sensitive-psychic desires,"
and "spiritual desires." Roughly, we may say that natural desires emerge
from the very structure of human reality, as is the case, for instance, with the
desire to know. Elicited desires are prompted by the cognitive recognition of
some object; sensitive-psychic desires are affective responses to an object
and are most often mediated, as Girard has taught us, through models; spiritual desires reflect the capacity of human intentional consciousness for selftranscendence in knowing and choosing, so that in pursuing knowledge we
want to know what really is so, and in deciding we want to choose what is
really and not merely apparently worthwhile. For the most part, Lonergan
has elucidated desires that may be termed natural and spiritual, and Girard
has elucidated elicited sensitive-psychic desires. Lonergan has also alerted
his readers to interferences in the pursuit of the natural desire for intelligibility, being and truth, and the good that may arise from elicited, sensitivepsychic desires. Girard not only has provided a set of core insights for understanding these elicited, sensitive-psychic desires but also offers perhaps the
most complete and most accurate theory of these desires yet put forward. 2
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The distinction between spiritual and sensitive-psychic may be introduced
by commenting on the following statement from Lonergan's systematic wcrk
on the Trinity :
.. . we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we
undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our
delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more acti ve when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge,
deliberate in order to choose, and will in order to act. (Lonergan 2007, 139)

Lonergan has provided a thorough explanatory account of the second ofthes.e
"ways of being conscious," a careful analysis of the unfolding of the eros A
the human spirit as we move by inquiry from data of sense and of consciou.,;ness to insight into the data, from insight to conceptualization and form ulc.tion of our understanding, from formulation to critical reflection, from critical reflection to a grasp of evidence, from grasp of evidence to judgment of
fact, from judgment of fact to deliberation, from deliberation to deliberativl!
insight and judgment of value, and from judgment of value to decision (primarily 1990; 1992). 3 This eros is driven by the native desire to know, wh ich
Lonergan identifies with the Aristotelian-Thomist "agent intellect," and
which he extends beyond knowledge to an orientation to the good (Lonergan
1990, chapter 2 on transcendental notion of value), and which he also identifies with Aquinas's natural desire to see God (\988). All of this is for
Lonergan "nature," a category which, I suggest as a Catholic theologian,
Girardian theory needs to incorporate. Obviously, in the concrete and rea!
order of things there is no such thing as pure human nature. The concrete
existential situation of human beings is theologically understood as infected
by sin and as standing under the offer of divine elevating and healing grace,
which we may either accept or reject. But sin distorts nature, while grace
elevates and perfects it, and both the distortions and the elevation are reflected in the realm of desire. A complete theory of desire is impossible
without the sort of heuristic of human nature provided by Lonergan.
Among the effects of "basic sin," which is nothing but a failure to reject a
morally reprehensible course of action or a failure to choose an obligatory
course of action, are the myriad combinations of bias that distort the regular
and consistent unfolding of the eros of the human spirit for being and the
real, for the good, and for God. Girard's mimetic theory provides a powerful
analysis of the distortions that arise from what Lonergan calls bias, and
Girard has contributed to Lonergan' s overall analysis by elucidating the mimetic sensitive-psychic desire involved in bias of all varieties. Lonergan
distinguishes individual, group, and dramatic bias, and the general bias of
common sense against the ulterior exigencies of attentive, intelligent. reasonable, and responsible intentional operation as these exigencies call for a
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move to: theory, the long-range point of view, and reflection on ultimate
issues (Lonergan 1992, chapters 6 and 7). He has called for and promoted the
self-appropriation of one' s rational and existential intentional operations.
Even before becoming familiar with Girard, I insisted that there is also required a self-appropriation of the vagaries of sensitive-psychic desire (Doran:
general argument 1994; theological implications 200 I). ( now maintain that
Girardian mimetic theory is the single most helpful means of fulfilling this
second requirement (Doran 2012).
Girard's basic contribution to Lonergan' s project is, thus, the elucidation
of the vagaries of the sensitive-psychic dimensions of desire as these interfere with or even prevent the efforts of the subject to be attentive, intelligent,
reasonable, responsible, and loving, or, in a word, self-transcendent. ( also
believe Lonergan makes a contribution to Girard. Part of that contribution
lies in the distinction ( have already summarized between spiritual desire and
sensitive-psychic desire, but part of it lies also in the distinction between
natural desire and elicited desire. An instance of a natural spiritual desire is
what Lonergan calls the pure, unrestricted desire to know. It is native to the
human being to raise and want answers to questions for intelligibility (What
is it?), for truth, (Is that so?), and for morally responsible action «(s this truly
good or only apparently good?). Contrasted with such a natural desire would
be what is known as elicited desire: desire for something that arises out of
perception of what is desired. Girard has shown, conclusively I believe, that
such elicited desires are mediated by models, that their structure is triangular,
that there is no immediate relation of subject to object in such desires, but
that the desire passes through the mediator or model from whom our desires
are elicited through the dynamics of mimesis.
Girardian mimetic theory, then, is a theory of elicited sensitive-psychic
desire, in particular as such desire is responsible for the distortion and deviation of the operations of the human spirit in search of intelligibility, truth and
being, the good, and God. The distortion and deviation of these operations
converts them into instruments for the satisfaction of elicited, sensitivepsychic, mimetic desire.
A further clarification that Lonergan provides offers mimetic theory a
refinement of the notions of autonomy and spontaneity, specifying a legitimate meaning to these two terms, a meaning that, if it is mimetic in any way,
is so in a manner quite different from the acquisitive mimesis whose dynamics Girard has elucidated. In this chapter, then, I wish to suggest a fruitful
mutual self-mediation 4 between Lonergan and Girard, where Girard offers
Lonergan a more precise maieutic of the interference with the unfolding of
the natural desire for intelligibility, the true and the real , the good, and God,
and where Lonergan offers Girard a more precise understanding of the meaning of "nature", I will suggest a more differentiated understanding ofsponta-
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neity and autonomy, and, most basic of all, a theology of the graced imitatiof':
of divine goodness.
THE DIVINE RELA nONS AND THEIR IMITA nONS
In the paper that I presented in Ottawa in 2006 (see note 1), I turned to a
statement that Lonergan makes about graced imitation in his systematics of
the Trinity. It is this imitation that I refer to when I speak of a very different
kind of mimesis from that studied by Girard. Lonergan talks about an imitation of the divine relations that is rendered possible by the gift of God' s
grace. That imitation is most often conscious but not known, vecu (lived), but
not thematique (reflectively objectified), implicit and not explicit, in Scholastic terms exercitus (exercised in practice) but not signatus (reflectively objectified). These terms all reflect Lonergan ' s distinction between consciousness
and knowledge. Consciousness is simply awareness, the self-presence of the
subject, while knowledge is a complex function of three kinds of conscious
acts: empirical, intelligent, and rational. Knowledge is the correct understanding of experience, while consciousness is simply experience. Lonergan
specifies the acts that constitute knowledge in a shorthand manner as experience, understanding, and judgment. These operations can be applied to conscious acts themselves, and then one undergoes what Lonergan calls selfappropriation: experiencing, understanding, and affirming one' s own operations of experiencing, understanding, and affirming. Then what was conscious, vecu, exercitus, becomes known, thematique, signatus (Lonergan
1990, chapter 1; 1992, chapter II). The distinction enables us to develop a
Christian theology of the world 's religions that would identify de facto conscious participation in Trinitarian life in those whose religious traditions do
not explicitly recognize the triune nature of God (see Doran 2012 for development of "world theology").
Thomist Trinitarian theology traditionally speaks of four divine relations:
paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Lonergan' s Trinitarian systematics speaks of created imitations of each of these divine relations. The two divine relations that are most relevant to my concerns are
active spiration and passive spiration, but I will present Lonergan ' s statement
in full and will speak briefly about the created imitations also of paternity
and filiation. My point is that the interpersonal state of grace establishes
imitations of divine life that run directly counter to the relations of mimetic
rivalry elucidated by Girard. Later in the chapter, I will relate this affirmation
back to the claim that I made above regarding Girard ' s need for an elaboration of the notion of nature.
Lonergan's statement, which has come to be called the "four-point
hypothesis," was proposed in a systematic work on Trinitarian theology first
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published in 1957 (1964, based on earlier notes from 1951-52 [2011)). The
hypothesis begins, " ... there are four real divine relations, really identical
with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes
that ground the external imitation of the divine substance" (2007, 471 , 473;
emphasis added).
As I have indicated, the four divine relations, to which Lonergan refers,
have traditionally been called paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. The three divine persons are relations: the Father is paternity,
the Son is filiation, and the Holy Spirit is passive spiration. In Trinitarian
theologies based on Thomas Aquinas' s spiritual or psychological analogy (as
Lonergan' s is), the Father and the Son together are the active spiration from
which the Holy Spirit, passive spiration, proceeds precisely as the proceeding
Love of Father and Son. Thus active spiration is only conceptually distinct,
not really distinct, from the Father and the Son considered together.
The four created imitations of divine being participating in the four divine
relations may be described as follows :
First, Lonergan adopts from Aquinas the notion of the "secondary act of
existence" of the incarnate Word, in an effort to delineate an ontological
constitution whereby the eternal divine Word subsists in both a divine nature
and a human nature. In metaphysical terms, the act of existence of the incarnate Word is the divine act of existence. Bot Jesus is a complete human
being, whose human nature has been assumed by the incarnate Word. The
person, the one who says " I," is the eternal Son of God. But that eternal Son
of God is present to himself not only with the divine consciousness, which is
his as Son of God but also with the human consciousness according to which
he is like us in all things but sin. Aquinas attempted to arrive at some remote
and hypothetical understanding of this mystery of faith , and in doing so
eventually hit upon the notion of a "secondary act of existence" proper to the
incarnate Word, according to which he is a complete human being whose
entire human nature has been assumed by the divine person of the Word.
Lonergan adds to Aquinas' s Christology the hypothesis that this ontological constituent may be regarded as a created participation in and imitation of
divine paternity, of the Father, of the one whom Jesus called "Abba." The
reasoning behind this hypothesis is that the secondary act of existence accruing to the assumed humanity of the Word is the created base of a created
relation of the assumed humanity to the eternal and uncreated Son, and any
created relation to the Son would share in the divine relation to the Son, the
relation that is the Father. This relation, as a created relation precisely to the
Son, imitates the eternal relation to the Son that is the Father. It participates
in and imitates divine paternity. Thus Jesus says, " Whoever has seen me has
seen the Father" (John 14.9). Again, the divine Word as such does not speak
but is spoken. However, the incarnate Word speaks in time, as the divine
Father speaks eternally, and he speaks only what he has heard from the

204

Chapter 10

Father (John 8.28). It is the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation that
enables the Word to do the works and speak the words of the Father.
While the grace of hypostatic union, which Aquinas and Lonergan partly
explain through the metaphysical hypothesis of a secondary act of existen;:,e
may truly be affirmed as the basic created grace on which all others depend,
still it is not the particular created imitation of divine life that most concerns
us in the present chapter. For we want to find something that is available n'.)t
only to the human being Jesus of Nazareth, but to all of us. The secondary aGt
of existence is unique to the incarnate Son of God. What we are looking fIX
is expressed rather in the second and third participations in divine life contained in Lonergan's four-point hypothesis.
The second element, then, is that the elevation to participation in divine
life that has traditionally been called "sanctifying grace" may fittingly be
understood as a created participation in and imitation of the active spiration
that is the Father and the Son together "breathing" the Holy Spirit. The gift of
God' s love establishes a created base of a created relation to the uncreated
Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, Trinitarian Proceeding Love, says Lonergan,
dwells in us not as some kind of formal cause, as Karl Rahner maintains
(1961 , 319--46), but as the tenn of a created relation. Because this relation is
a relation to the Holy Spirit, it imitates the Father and the Son together
actively " breathing" love in their acknowledgment of each other as infinitely
lovable. The reception of the divine favor, of the grace that makes us pleasing to God (gratia gratum jaciens, in the medieval expression) is the reception of our own lovableness in the sight of God, which also enables us to love
with the very love of the Father and the Son, and so to "breathe" charity in a
manner that is analogous to the way in which the Father and the Son
"breathe" the Holy Spirit.
Third, then, the charity that is ' breathed' from the reception of our own
lovableness in God' s eyes, that is, from what a metaphysical theology calls
"sanctifying grace," is love of the God who breathed into us the gift of love.
It is love issuing forth in grateful return for the gift. It is a created participation in and imitation of the passive spiration, the divine Proceeding Love,
that is the Holy Spirit. Charity is an infused habit, or perhaps in modem
terms an infused circle of operations, that is the created base of a created
relation to the uncreated Father and Son who consequently also dwell in us as
the uncreated terms of created relations. Charity is, in Lonergan' s words, the
dynamic state of being in love with God. Because it is a relation to the Father
and the Son, it imitates the Holy Spirit, who is an uncre~ted relation of
passive spiration, uncreated Proceeding Love, with respe~t to the eternal
Father and Son who together "spirate" the Spirit of their mutual love. In
Christians, this love -of God in return is companionship with the incarnate
Word, who relates us in transcendent hope to the Father. In those to whom
the same gift has been given but without the objectification that comes from
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Trinitarian belief, we may speak of its manifestations in such dispositions as
the love of wisdom and the transcendence that relates us to the ultimate, a
transcendence manifest in diverse ways in the various religions of the world.
Fourth, what Thomas and Lonergan call the "light of glory" is the created
condition of the promised vision of God that we already hope for in this life
as we yearn to see the Father. When it is finally bestowed upon us, it will be a
created participation in and imitation of divine filiation, as the incarnate Son
leads the children of adoption perfectly back to the eternal Father. In this
way, it is the created base of a created relation to the uncreated Father to
whom we are related in hope in this life.
The first and the fourth of these created imitations of the divine relations
are not available to human consciousness in this life. The first is peculiar to
the incarnate Son of God, Jesus of Nazareth. The fourth will be available to
human consciousness in the beatific knowing that is our destiny, and is
available to us, now, only inchoately in the virtue of hope. What is available
to human consciousness in this life are the second and the third of these
created imitations of divine life, and it is on these that I focus as I speak of
imitations of the divine relations.
Lonergan's four-point systematic-theological hypothesis thus proposes
that sanctifying grace is to charity as active spiration is to passive spiration,
and so that created habitual grace in its totality has a trinitarian structure, that
it participates in and imitates the trinitarian relations of active and passive
spiration. In my elaborations on this hypothesis, I have suggested that God' s
offer of this gift of participation in divine life through created relations to the
three divine persons is universal, that is, that it is offered to all men and
women at every time and place, but also that it is differentiated, made known,
thematique, signatus, exp\.icit, through the divine revelation recorded in the
Jewish and Christian scriptures.
The universal mission of the Holy Spirit, the gift of divine love, is not
only intensified but also revealed, made thematic, in the visible mission of
the Son, where it plays a constitutive role. A visible mission of the Holy
Spirit at Pentecost fulfills the twofold mission of the Son and the Spirit and
enables a public acknowledgment that what happened in Jesus was indeed
the revelation of the triune God in history. The mutual interplay of divine and
human freedom can now be carried on in explicit recognition of what. prior
to the revelation that comes to its fulfilment in the mission of the incarnate
Word, necessarily remained vecu (lived) but not thematique (reflectively
objectified), implicit but not recognized, conscious but not known, present in
actu exercito (in practice) but not in actu signato (as signified).
I regard Rene Girard' s thought as a substantial contribution to the theology of the Christian word, and so to the theology of revelation. The visible
mission of the incarnate Word is among other things the explicit revelation,
through linguistic and incarnate meaning, of what God has always been
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doing and continues to do in the inner word of the invisible mission of th~
Holy Spirit. Entailed in that revelation, intrinsic to it, is the solution to th~;
evils consequent on mimetic infection and contagion, namely, the command
to "be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect," where perfection means
"love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may bt
children of your Father who is in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evE
and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust" (Matthew
5.44--45).

One of the ways in which this gift of mutually reciprocal relations to the
divine persons can be made available to consciousness is through recollection or memory providing evidence sufficient for the silent, indeed ineffable,
judgment of value that assents to being on the receiving end of unqualified
love. For Augustine memoria (memory), is the state in which the mind
(mens) finds itself, and there is a graced memoria, a transformed state in
which the mind finds itself, a recollection that functions in an analogy based
in grace as the analogue for the divine Father. I am suggesting that it does so
precisely as it provides evidence grasped as sufficient for the judgment of
value that assents to the gift of divine love.
That assent changes everything in a person' s life. The proceeding judgment of value is what Lonergan calls the faith born of religious love, and it
establishes a new horizon for everything (Lonergan 1990, 117-18). It functions in the same analogy as the analogue for the divine Word. From recollection and faith operating together, there proceeds charity, love of the givers
of the gift in return. For Christians, that love becomes more and more an
explicit relation of companionship with the divine Word made flesh and an
explicit relation of hope for the vision of the divine Father. For those who do
not have the revelation that makes this explicit, that love is a love of wisdom
and a hope that keeps the quest for truth alive against all odds. The Trinitarian structure of active and passive spiration is present in the graced dimensions of all who have received the gift, whether or not it is articulated thematically as Trinitarian on the basis of God 's revelation in the incarnate Word. A
Christian theology of the world' s religions, in their positive moments will
thus be Trinitarian at the core.
AUTONOMOUS SPIRITUAL PROCESSIONS
I wish now to return to the notion of nature, which I believe is an important
qualification to be added to what we might call Girardian anthropology.
Theological understanding of the divine relations is grounded in an understanding of the divine processions, and for Lonergan (as for Aquinas), the
key to reaching an obscure and analogical understanding of the divine pro-
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cessions lies in what Aquinas calls emanatio intel/igibilis, inteIligible emanation, precisely in the order of nature.
What do Aquinas and Lonergan mean by " intelligible emanation"? If I
grasp that there is sufficient evidence to posit a conception as true, the inner
assent, the silent "yes" of the judgment of fact that I utter emanates with
rational exigency from the grasp of the evidence as sufficient. Again, if I
grasp that there is sufficient evidence to affirm something or someone as a
genuine value, the silent "yes" of the judgment of value that I utter emanates
with existential autonomy from the grasp of the evidence. The judgment of
value, moreover, is a word that breathes love (verbum spirans amorem), and
so from the evidence grasped and the consequent judgment of value together
there proceeds or emanates love, at least in the form of responsible decision.
Thus, the intelligible emanation ofajudgment of value, "Yes," from a reflective grasp of evidence regarding what is good provides one variant of the socalled "psychological analogy" to enable us to have some very remote and
imperfect understanding of what the procession of the Son from the Father
might be. And the intelligible emanation ofa loving decision from this grasp
of evidence and judgment of value operating as a unified principle provides
one variant of the psychological analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit
from the Father and the Son. This particular analogy, unlike the one I suggested above from the structure of grace, is taken from the natural unfolding
of the eros of the human spirit for intelligibility, truth and being, and the
good. And it manifests precisely what is meant by emanatio intelligibilis.
In my own work I have chosen to render emanatio intelligibilis as "autonomous spiritual procession." It is precisely in the notion of autonomy that we
will find, I suggest, a contribution to mimetic theory that comes from the
clarifications of the notion of nature to be found in Lonergan 's work. Girard
speaks of the illusion we entertain regarding the autonomy of our desires.
More precisely, he conjoins the two terms "spontaneity" and "autonomy," so
that they mean various aspects of the same thing, aspects that he claim are
illusory (Girard 1966, opening pages). I wish to distinguish the two more
sharply. It is only what Lonergan calls processions of act from act in the
spiritual realm that he regards as legitimately autonomous. I wish to add, in
conversation with Girard, that the legitimacy of the autonomy results from
the fact that these processions in their integrity are not governed by the
interdividual field. s That field constitutes what I called above the first way of
being conscious. This first way of being conscious includes the sensitivepsychic passive reception of desire and fear within the realm of primordial
intersubjectivity, and it can infect the second way of being conscious with all
the vagaries of mimetic contagion that Girard elucidates. Autonomy is
present in a legitimate way only when the second way of being conscious has
not been infected by the first.
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This autonomy is also not present in the spiritual emergence of insights
from questions, for that is an emergence of act from potency, not of act from
act. As such, however, it constitutes what Lonergan would regard as a legitimate spontaneity in the second way of being conscious. Thus he distinguishes spontaneity from autonomy, and assigns to each a meaning that is not
subject to Girard' s hermeneutic of suspicion.
What, then, is legitimate human autonomy? The eros of the human spirit,
in its movement from experience through understanding and judgment to
right decision, manifests along the way not only the spontaneous emergence
of act from potency as answers suddenly emerge from questions but also
careful, self-possessed, assured originations of new acts from previous acts.
Included in these are the emergence of inner words of hypothetical conceptualization from insightful grasp of intelligibility, the emergence of judgments
of fact from the reflective grasp of the sufficiency of evidence, the emergence of judgments of value from loving grasp of the evidence of goodness,
and the emergence ofloving acts or responsible decisions from the collaboration ofloving grasp and the word of value that it has uttered.
In the emergence of act from potency, the principle is the object; in the
emergence of act from act, the principle is the subject. What I am calling
autonomous spiritual processions are indeed a function of human desire, but
of the natural and spiritual desire that is to be distinguished from the elicited
and sensitive-psychic desires whose mimetic structure Girard has elucidated.
Especially, when those processions entail authentic operations of value judgments and loving decisions, the desire that they express and indeed inchoately fulfill is quite different from the acquisitive mimetic desire that Girard
illuminates. My thesis is that there are desires that are best understood as
natural participations in divine light and love: the desire for intelligibility, the
desire for the truth that is the medium of the knowledge of the real, the desire
for the good. These participations always are conscious but frequently are not
known for what they are. And even the consistent exercise of the natural
desires is a function of the grace that I mentioned of above.
We may provide more detail concerning what is meant by "spiritual" in
contrast to "sensitive-psychic." In Insight Lonergan draws a distinction between the inteIligible and the intelligent. Empirical objects are potentially
intelligible: they can be understood. The unities and laws of things are formally intelligible: understanding has grasped unity and law. The existence of
these unities and the occurrence of events in accord with the laws are actually intelligible : the formal intelligibilities are affirmed to be. But the disinterested, detached, unrestricted desire to know is potentially intelligent: when
its promptings revealed in questions are followed upon, they will lead to
understanding. Acts of understanding are known as insights. They grasp
unities and laws, and they ground conceptions of the unities and laws. As
such, they are formally intelligent: understanding has occurred. The further
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reflective insights that grasp the sufficiency of evidence to pronounce judgment on our understanding, and the judgments that emanate from such reflective understanding and posit being as known, are actually intelligent. Thus,
as known to ourselves, we are intelligible, as every other known is, but that
intelligibility, unlike the intelligibility of other known realities, is also intelligence and knowing.
Now for Lonergan intelligibility that is also intelligent is precisely what is
meant by " spiritual," and that is the sense in which I am using the word
"spiritual" here. Thomas Aquinas's emanatio intelligibilis refers to what Lonergan calls spiritual intelligibility, the intelligibility that is also intelligent,
the intelligibility of intelligence, reasonableness, and moral responsibility in
act, where "act" is manifest in such operations as insight, conception, grasp
of evidence, and judgment.
We proceed now to the meaning of "autonomous. " When a judgment of
value proceeds because of and in proportion to the evidence grasped, and
when a 10Ying decision proceeds because of and in proportion to both the
evidence grasped and the judgment of value, the human subject has attained a
legitimate form of autonomy. A sound judgment is sound because it proceeds
(a) from a grasp of sufficient evidence that I know is sufficient, and (b) in
accord with or in proportion to the evidence that has been grasped. A good
decision is good because it proceeds (a) from the grasp of evidence and the
sound jUdgment, and (b) in accord with or in proportion to both of these
sources together grounding the decision. The relation conveyed by the
phrases "because of' and "in accord with" and " in proportion to," precisely
as this relation is known to and acted on by the acting subject, constitutes
genuine autonomy. This is what I mean by rendering Thomas's and Lonergan' s "intelligible emanation" in the language of autonomous spiritual processions. In the expression "autonomous spiritual procession," the word
"autonomous" refers precisely to the "because of' and "in accord with" or
"in proportion to" aspect of the procession of word from understanding and
of loving decision from understanding and word together, precisely as that
aspect is known by the subject to constitute the relation between what
grounds the procession and what proceeds from that ground. And this is part
of the very notion of human nature that, I suggest, Girardian theory needs for
its completion.
I distinguish, then, and perhaps in a manner that Girard does not, between
"autonomous" and "spontaneous." I find a genuine meaning for both terms,
even while acknowledging that Girard has exposed illusions in regard to
those meanings. There are in human consciousness processions, even spiritual processions, that are not autonomous but spontaneous. One example of a
spontaneous as contrasted with an autonomous spiritual procession is the
emergence of an act of understanding from data organized by imagination
under the dynamism of inquiry. This procession is distinct from the subse-
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quent autonomous spiritual procession that is the emergence of an objectif cation or conceptualization from the act of understanding or of a judgmem
from the reflective grasp of evidence. What is the difference? From reflecting
on our own experience, we can, I believe, verifY that the emergence of
insight from data organized by imagination under the dynamism of inquiry ~ s
an instance of what anyone influenced by Aristotle would call the emergen",'!
of act from potency, whereas the emergence of hypothetical conceptualizations from the insight itself is an emergence of one act from another acr.
Since there is no movement from potency to act in God, who is pure ac~,
what I am calling spontaneous processions will not provide a fitting or suitable analogy for understanding divine processions. The processions in hu~
man consCiousness that will provide such an analogy must be processions oT
act from act. Even then, of course, the analogy is deficient. God is one aC'l,
consciously participated in in distinct ways by three divine persons, wherea:;
insight and subsequent conceptualizations or objectifications in human COIiisciousness are distinct acts, as are reflective grasp of the sufficiency of evi·,
dence and consequent judgments of fact or of value.
The dimension of spiritual autonomy that provides Lonergan with the
appropriate realm in which to locate an analogy for Trinitarian processions
lies in what he calls "existential self-constitution", that is, in the emergence
of good decision from an authentic judgment of value based on a reflective
grasp of evidence, precisely with regard to the question, What am I to make
of myselfl The evidence grasped by an authentic person is first and foremost
evidence regarding existential self-constitution: What would it be good for
me to be? The consequent judgment of value is an assent to that grasped
ideal. The proceeding love that leads to self-transcendent decision flows
from the grasped evidence and consequent judgment. In an analogous manner, the divine Word is a judgment of value resting on agape, Loving Intelligence in act, originatively constituting divine being. Divine Proceeding
Love, the Holy Spirit, is spirated from such a dual origin: from Loving Grasp
and the divine "Yes, this is very good!" as the two acknowledge each other's
lovableness and breathe the Spirit of Love that unites them.
In this section, we have been presenting a version of the Thomist-Lonerganian psychological analogy from human nature for understanding what
Christians profess in faith regarding divine procession: "God from God,
Light from Light, true God from true God." But as we saw in the previous
section, Lonergan's four-point theological hypothesis adds the possibility of
constructing an analogy in the supernatural order, one that posits graced
imitations of, participations in, the divine relations themselves. The secondary act of existence of the Incarnate Word participates in divine paternity.
The reception of the gift of divine love participates in divine active spiration.
The habit of charity-loving God in return-participates in divine passive
spiration. The light of glory participates in divine filiation. All four of these
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created supernatural realities are analogues for divine relations. But they are
also more than that. They are imitations-by-participation.
The full analogy in the order of grace would be based on the imitationsby-participation in active and passive spiration. The structure of this analogy
is the same as that of the analogy from nature. There is the procession of
assent from intelligent grasp of evidence, providing the analogy for the procession of the Son, and there is the procession of acts of love from grasp-andassent considered as the one principle of love, providing the analogy for the
procession of the Holy Spirit. But in the analogy within the supernatural
order, the grasp of evidence is explicitly the grasp of a lover who has been
loved with an unqualified love, and the assent is loving assent to that gift.
The dynamic state of loving with God's love, not our own, and so the gift of
loving in an unqualified fashion, governs the entire movement from beginning to end.
THE DUALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE DIALECTIC OF
DESIRE
Let me recall the important passage from Lonergan's book The Triune God:
Systematics, which I cited above and to which I now wish to return in a more
detailed conversation with Girard: " . . . we are conscious in two ways: in one
way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and
imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we
consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a
word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and
will in order to act" (2007, '139), Within both sensitive-psychic and spiritual
processes, a distinction is to be drawn between the emergence of act from
potency and the emergence of act from act. At the level of the spiritual, this
becomes the distinction I have drawn between spontaneous and autonomous
processions.
The integrity of spiritual process, whether natural or supernatural and
whether spontaneous or autonomous, entails fidelity to a natural, transcendental orientation of human spiritual desire to the intelligible, the true and the
real, and the good. This transcendental orientation is a natural participation in
uncreated light. Within our present context, we should emphasize as well that
it is a natural, not elicited, desire in the spiritual order for being, for the true,
for the good, for God.
Lonergan consistently emphasizes that there are other desires that would
interfere with the unfolding of the transcendental, spiritual, sometimes autonomous, active desire for being and value-with the pure, unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know what is and to do what is good, a desire
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ultimately for union with God. We can approach an understanding of tbis
problem from what Lonergan says about the two ways of being conscimls,
and we can enlist the invaluable assistance of Girard in doing so.
Discriminating these two dimensions of human self-presence is an extraordinarily sensitive and delicate enterprise. Christian ascetical tradition
has often neglected the positive importance of the sensitive-psychic dimension, while psychological theory tends to overlook the spiritual dimensi u.
The first way of being conscious permeates the second, either in support (Of
the transcendental orientation to the intelligible, the true, the real, and tbl,!
good, or in conflict with it. Again, and more precisely, the first way of being
conscious precedes, accompanies, and overarches the intentional operation:;
that constitute the second way of being conscious. It precedes these oper:~c.
tions in the transition from the neural to the psychic, with all the ambiguitk 3
of dreaming consciousness and myth, but also with the release of the images
that are needed for insight and the symbols that manifest our higher aspirations and beckon us to follow them. It accompanies the operations in the
feelings that are the mass and momentum of intentional consciousness. Anu
it overarches these operations in establishing us as lover and beloved, as
members of community, as subjects whose consciousness or self-presence is
itself interpersonal, not with the interdividuality of the purely psychic but
with the communion characteristic of those who are principles of benevolence and beneficence.
Thus, distinguishing the two ways of being conscious and negotiating
their relations calls for what Christian spiritual tradition has called discernment. What we undergo rather passively in what we sense and imagine, in
our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness, affects
the entire range of our spiritual orientation as it actually unfolds. Under
optimal circumstances, this first way of being conscious bolsters and supports the second way, where we consciously inquire in order to understand,
understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and will in order to act. But those optimal circumstances are relatively rare. In fact, they are never reached without help from
others and ultimately from the grace of God. To the extent that they are not
achieved, there is a statistical near-inevitability of distortion precisely in the
spiritual dimensions of human operation. Integrity in those dimensions, and
especially in autonomous processions of act from act in human spirituality, is
ever precarious, and is always reached by withdrawing from inauthenticity.
Girard has called attention to the extremely precarious nature of human
claims to autonomous subjectivity. These precautions are salutary for anyone
hoping to resurrect the psychological analogy in Trinitarian theology. Lonergan has called attention to authenticity and inauthenticity in the very realms
of understanding, truth, moral development, and religion, the realms that are
also appealed to for the analogy. These areas are positively treated when he
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speaks of intellectual, moral, and religions conversion, but these conversions
are required for the consistent integrity of spiritual performance. And in my
own writings I have called attention to a distinct dimension of authenticity
and conversion that affects primarily the first "way of being conscious." I
have spoken of psychic conversion. Girard gives us a better purchase on
these psychic dimensions of desire than do other current or recent explorations. Being very clear with him about the character of false mimesis and
deviated transcendence precisely as they affect and distort intellectual, moral,
and religious operations will help students of Lonergan and of theology in
general to isolate much more clearly just where in consciousness the genuine
imago Dei really lies.
Thus, I propose (1) that what Girard has written about desire concerns
directly the first "way of being conscious," that is, the sensitive, psychic
dimension of consciousness, but also (2) that this dimension penetrates our
spiritual orientation to the intelligible, the true and the real, and good, and
that it does so for better or for worse.
I presume that we are all aware of Girard' s explication of mimetic or
triangular desire, and of his distinction between acquisitive or appropriative
mimetic desire and a possible desire, even a form of mimetic desire, that
functions in positive ways. I would suggest:
• that what Lonergan calls the first way of being conscious is precisely
interdividual, in Girard' s sense,
• that psychic development entails the negotiation of this interdividual field ,
a negotiation that (1) would take the subject through something like what
CG. Jung ~alls individuation, but without the vagaries and confusions of
Jungian explications, 6 and (2) would lead beyond individuation to genuine
interpersonal relations as one moves consistently into dynamic state of
being in love,
• that this negotiation calls upon the operations of the second way of being
conscious, that is, upon inquiry, insight, conceptualization, weighing evidence, judging, deliberating, and deciding,
• that inadequate negotiations of the interdividual field can and will distort
the second way of being conscious, and
• that authentic negotiation of the same field will allow the second way to
flourish in the development of the person.
It seems important to stress that Girard ' s complex conceptions of mimetic
desire presuppose a radical insufficiency in the very being of the desiring
individual. There is a radical ontological sickness at the core of internal
appropriative mimetic desire. The individual is at some level painfully aware
of his or her own emptiness, and it is this awareness that leads one to crave so
desperately the fullness of being that supposedly lies in others. The figures
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onto whom such desire is projected mediate being itselffor us. It is via them
that we seek to become real, and it is through wanting their very being that
we come to imitate them. The wish to absorb the other or to be absorbed by
or into the substance of the other implies an insuperable revulsion for one 's
own being. 7 Such metaphysical desire is masochism or pseudo-masochism, a
will to self-destruction that manifests itself in attempts to become something
or someone other than what one is. The self-sufficiency attributed to the
model is, of course, illusory, and so the project to attain it is doomed from the
outset. But even if one vaguely perceives the fruitlessness of the quest, one
does not give it up, because to do so would mean admitting that the salvation
one craves is impossible to achieve. One may even become the tormentor,
torturing others as one was oneself tortured, and so masochism is transformed into sadism.
I find a threefold benefit to be gained by Lonergan students from a serious
study of Girard's exposure of these dynamics. First, Girard's position shows
that there is a much greater complexity than might be obvious to the two
ways of being conscious to which Lonergan refers; in particular, much more
enters into the first way of being conscious than might be obvious from
Lonergan's description of it. The passive reception of what we sense and
imagine, of our desires and our fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and
sadness, is not some simple, one-dimensional reality. It is extraordinarily
complex, and the mimetic model of desire throws more light on that complexity than any other position of which I am aware.
Second, Girard also shows the interrelations of the two ways of being
conscious. For one thing, it is ultimately a spiritual emptiness that leads to
the derailments of mimetic desire, an emptiness that recalls Augustine 's
"You have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you"
(Augustine 1960, 44). But also, the only resolution of mimetic violence is the
complete renunciation of the rivalry to which triangular acquisitive desire
leads us, and that renunciation is an intensely spiritual act flowing from a
decision that itself proceeds from acknowledging the facts in true judgment.
In other words, the resolution of the problems to which acquisitive mimetic
desire gives .rise takes place through a series of autonomous spiritual processions that are precisely the sort of emanations that Lonergan regards as
appropriate for the psychological Trinitarian analogy.
Finally, I regard the vagaries of mimetic desire to which Girard gives us
entrance as the principal instances of what Lonergan calls dramatic bias and
also of the psychological components of the other forms of bias that Lonergan exposes. These components introduce the blind spot that Lonergan describes so powerfully in his description of dramatic bias. 8
My questions to Girard would be the following. First, his work raises for
me the question of the significance precisely for mimetic theory of the natural spiritual desire for intelligibility, truth and being, and the good, and ulti-
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mately for God, that Lonergan has clarified. There is a radical ontological
desire that itself is not mimetic but that is involved in various ways in all
mimetic desire. And so I ask: Is imitative desire brought on by a sense of
spiritual inadequacy that is endemic to the human condition? Is the story of
imitative desire a story of the successes and failures of mutual self-mediation
in the attempt, itself completely legitimate, to find the completion of one's
being? Is Girard' s mimetic violence, which springs from imitative desire, the
fate of mutual self-mediation gone wrong? Is there healthy mutual self-mediation? Do we all suffer from such a radical ontological insufficiency that
these double binds are inevitable for all of us? Or is there a mediation that
can quiet the sense of spiritual inadequacy and enable human relations to be
something other than the violent mimesis that Girard depicts? What is it that
enables one to renounce mimetic rivalry completely, without using this renunciation as a feigned indifference that is just another way to get what one
wants? Is the tendency to compare oneself to others not rooted in an ontological emptiness that only God can fill? Is there a way of negotiating this
emptiness that transcends victimization by the triangular situation that necessarily will be involved in the negotiation? What is the source of our fascination with the saints? Think of Ignatius Loyola asking, What would it mean if
I were to do in my situation what Francis and Dominic did in theirs? Or
again, think of Bernard Lonergan asking, as he must have, What would it
mean if I were to do in my situation what Thomas Aquinas did in his? The
mimetic quality of the questions is obvious. But in either case it led to
something quite other than the tortured quality of internally mediated relations. It led to autonomous spiritual processions of word and love that were
in fact created participations in triune life.
These questions can be answered, I believe, by appealing to the transcendental desires of the human spirit, to Lonergan 's second way of being conscious. "All people by nature desire to know," Aristotle says at the very
beginning of the Metaphysics. This becomes Lonergan's leitmotif throughout
Insight, where he unpacks the dynamics of the desire to know in mathematics, science, common sense, and philosophy, as well as the devices that we
employ to flee understanding when we do not want to face the truth. In his
later work he extends this transcendental desire to the notion of the good.
Girard insists, correctly, that almost all learning is based on imitation, and so
satisfying the desire to know involves mimetic behavior. But the present
question is, Are the desire to know and the transcendental intention of value
themselves a function of acquisitive mimesis? Are they acquisitive desires?
Or is acquisitiveness a perversion of these desires? Is there such a thing as a
detached, disinterested desire to know? Girard himself speaks of a true vocation of thought that lies in integrating isolated discoveries into a rational
framework and transforming them into real knowledge (\987, 7). Is not that
an indication of what Lonergan calls the desire to know? Is it not an instance
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of Lonergan's second way of being conscious, where we "inquire in order ~o
understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order ';0
judge" (1964, 139)? How does fidelity to this vocation differ from acqu i ~i 
tive mimesis? How can it be infected and derailed by acquisitive mimesis?
These questions are worth pursuing. And in a further extension of the sarr:e
set of questions, can Lonergan students ignore how Girard has clarified in t.n
astounding fashion the influence that distorted mimesis has on the realm of
the sacred, which in its authenticity pertains primarily to the second way 'if
being conscious, an influence that Girard calls deviated transcendence? Will
not these clarifications help us get straight just where the genuine imago Dei,
and so the genuine imitatio Dei, resides?
IMAGO DEI

Where is the imago that is also an imitatio? We have seen two instances, one
in human nature itself and the other in that nature as elevated to participatio\1
in the divine relations. Foundationally, the image of God lies in the created
participation in active and passive spiration, the share in divine life given to
us by God. That participation is, first, the gift of being on the receiving end
of love in an unqualified fashion. This gift prompts an existential judgment
of value, a knowledge born of the gift of love, a word that breathes love in
return, the word of faith . That love in return is the charity born of the reception of love and the acknowledgment of that reception, a charity that is
inspired by gratitude for the gift given. This process may serve as an analogy
for the divine relations of active and passive spiration, relations which encompass the entirety of immanent Trinitarian life.
But this supernatural imitatio may itself be understood by analogy with an
imitation of God in the very order of nature, an imitation that lies within
actively intelligent, actively reasonable, actively deliberative consciousness,
that is, in the second way of being conscious that Lonergan specifies. In fact,
it has been in the context of the autonomy of the operations performed in th is
natural unfolding of the transcendental orientation that we have found a
fruitful encounter with Girard's mimetic theory. Girard has introduced a
necessary hermeneutic of suspicion into the project of self-appropriation initiated by Lonergan, a hermeneutic that is probably the best categorial articulation to date of what my own work anticipated heuristically by speaking of a
need for psychic conversion. He has captured the interference of acquisitively mimetic desire with the unfolding of the transcendental orientation. But
there is an imago Dei, and an imitatio Dei- imago and imitatio are from the
same root-that is natural, that resides in our spiritual nature, where "nature"
is understood in the Aristotelian sense of an immanent principle of movement and of rest. The imago Dei or imitatio Dei is not the whole of that
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spiritual nature, for that nature is ''the human spirit as raising and answering
questions" and so is potency in the realm of spiritual matters. But there are
moments in which that nature precisely as nature imitates the pure act that is
God, however remotely: when from understanding as act there proceeds an
inner word of conceptualization in act, when from the grasp of evidence as
sufficient there proceeds a judgment whether of fact or of value, and when
from a judgment of value there proceeds a good decision or an act of love.
That natural image can be used as an analogy from which we may understand
the more radical image or imitation that lies in a created participation in the
divine relations of active and passive spiration.
Lonergan writes, "The psychological analogy ... has its starting point in
that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is
the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments
of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of
loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature" (1985, 93). The quotation
is applicable equally, of course, to natural and graced states of being. But the
dynamic state of being is on the receiving end of a love that is without any
reservations or qualifications, a love that makes us lovable because it elevates us to participation in divine life, is precisely the gift that the four-point
hypothesis construes as a created participation in divine active spiration.
From that love received, there flows a knowledge born of love that is a silent
judgment of value proceeding as act from act. These two, together, imitate
divine active spiration, and what proceeds from this created participation in
active spiration is the love in return that relates us to the Father and the Son
who gave the love in the first place. The supernatural analogy imitates by
participation the entire life of the triune God. It is only by the grace of this
created imitation, whether it is known as such or not-and most often it is
not-that the natural transcendental unfolding of our spiritual aspirations
remains authentic.

REFERENCES
Augustine. 1960. Confessions, book I, chapter I. See The Confessions ofSt. Augustine. Translated by John K. Ryan. New York: Doubleday Image.
Doran, Robert M. 1994. Subject and Psyche. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
- - . 2001 [1990). Theology and the Dialectics of History. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
- - . 2006. "Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: Revisiting a Topic That
Deserves Further Reflection," Lonergan Workshop 19, edited by Fred Lawrence (Boston
College, 2006) 83-106.
--.2012. The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions, Volume I: Missions
And Processions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Girard, Rene. 1966. Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure.
Translated by Yvonne Freccero. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
- - - . 1987. Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World. Translated by Stephen Bann
and Michael Metteer. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

218

Chapter 10

Lonergan, Bernard. 1985. "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections." Pp. 74-94 in A
Third Collection . Edited by Frederick E. Crowe. Mahwah, N J.: Paulist Press.
- - -. 1988. "The Natural Desire to See God." Chapter 5 in Collected Works of Bernard
Lonergan, Volume 4. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1988.
- -- . 1990. Method in Theology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- - -. 1992. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Volume 3 in Collected Works of
Bernard Lonergan, Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran . Toronto: University ofToronto Press.
- - -. 1996. "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer." In Philosophical and Theological Papers
1958- 1964. Edited by Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran,
160--82. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- -- . 2007. The Triune God: Systematics. Translated by Michael G. Shields. Edited by
Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour. Volume 12 in Collected Works of Bernard
Lonergan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 139.
---.2011. "Previously unpublished notes on grace from 1951- 52" . Early Latin Theology.
Volume 19 in Lonergan' s Collected Works. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Rahner, Karl. 1961. " Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace. " In
Theological Investigations, vol. I . Translated by Cornelius Ernst. London : Darton, Longman & Todd.

NOTES
I. I was privileged to be invited to participate in the Koblenz and Ottawa meetings of the
Colloquium on Violence and Religion, as part of an effort to promote dialogue between students of Rene Girard and students of Bernard Lonergan. In Koblenz, I was part of a panel
organized by Sonja Bardelang, which included Gilles Mongeau of Regis College, Toronto, and
Mark Miller, then a student at Boston College and now a professor at the University of San
Francisco. In Ottawa I was scheduled again to participate in a panel, but at the last minute the
other participants were unable to come. I had already written a lengthy paper entitled "Imitating
the Divine Relatlons: A Theological Contribution to Mimetic Theory," which had been submitted to Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies and which was recently published there (Robert M.
Doran, "Imitating the Divine Relations: A Theological Contribution to Mimetic Theory,"
Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 23:2, 2005, delayed publication to 2009, 149-86). I
offered to present a half-hour summary of this paper in Ottawa, and Kenneth Melchin of St
Paul's University, Ottawa, graciously consented to respond to the paper. Bill Johnsen kindly
asked me whether he might publish the paper in Contagion, where it subsequently appeared
(Robert M. Doran, "Summarizing ' Imitating the Divine Relations,'" Contagion: Journal of
Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 14, 2007,27-38). The present chapter revisits what appeared in
Contagion and adds what I hope are helpful updates and clarifications that have come to me
over the past five years.
2. The distinction "sensitive-psychic and spiritual" as a diagnostic of Girard and Lonergan
is my own, but the use of the added traditional theological differential of "elicited and natural" I
owe to Neil Ormerod, in a lecture that I heard him deliver in April 20 I 0 at Loyola Marymount
University, Los Angeles.
.
3. Among students of Lonergan, the only step in this process whose dynamics are still
subject to some disagreement has to do with the move from deliberation to deliberative insights
and judgments of value. I have presented my own view on these matters in "Ignatian Themes in
the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: Revisiting a Topic That Deserves Further Reflection,"
Lonergan Workshop 19, ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston College, 2006) 83-106. The back issues of
Lonergan Workshop and of Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies have been uploaded to the
website www.lonerganresource.com. This paper may be found in a second spot on the same
website, in the e-book " Essays in Systematic Theology."
4. Mutual self-mediation is instanced wherever the self-understanding of one person or
group is a function of communication with another person or group, and the self-understanding
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of the other person or group is a function of the same communication. The category is explained in detail by Lonergan (1996). I am suggesting that such attempts as the present essay to
bring Lonergan and Girard into communication with each other can be enriching to both.
S. See the following remark by Jean-Michel Oughourlian in Rene Girard (1987, 199,
emphasis in the text): " . .. the real human subject can only come out of the rule of the
Kingdom; apart from this rule, there is never anything but mimetism and the ' interdividual.'
Until this happens, the only subject is the mimetic structure." Girard 's response (ibid.): "That is
quite right." " Interdividual" refers to the same dimension that Lonergan calls "primordial
intersubjectivity," but Girard adds the insistence on the mimetic character of this dimension.
On intersubjectivity, see Lonergan, Insight. 237~2.
6. The confusions in Jungian theory are a function of not distinguishing two kinds of
opposites: contraries, which can be reconciled with one another, and contradictories, which
cannot. Consciousness and the unconscious are contraries, as are the masculine and feminine
dimensions of the psyche. Good and evil are contradictories. See chapter 10 in Doran, Theology
and the Dialectics of History for details.
7. These reflections are probably related to Lonergan' s insistence that the basic philosophic
counter-position is to regard being as a subdivision of the "already out there now." But that is
material for another paper and cannot be developed here.
8. Lonergan, Insight 21S . Girard enables us to link the "blind spot" with the intersubjectivity that Lonergan discusses later in his treatment of bias. That link is not explicit in Lonergan ' s
account.

